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Abbreviations and Glossary
Pinyin is used as the primary romanization system for Chinese terms in this book. However, the Wade-Giles romanization system is used for names and organizations in Taiwan, for example, Lee-Teng-hui, Lien Chan and Kuomintang-which would be Li Denghui, Lian Zhan, and Guomindang, respectively in Pinyin. Pinyin is used for the titles of works published in Taiwan.
P R E F A C E
This book explains the paradoxical development of deepening economic integration and interdependence and rising political tensions in current relations across the Taiwan Strait. In this paradoxical development, Beijing's policy designed to stem the separatist drift in Taiwan through an engagement with trade and investment has only driven the two sides further apart politically. Yet Taipei's policy of restricting the pace and direction of trade and investment flows to the mainland has equally failed. The book analyzes the dynamics of economic statecraft and strategic interactions across the Taiwan Strait, as well as the conflicts between the objectives of the states and the interests of the private sector. Both mainland China and Taiwan are widely regarded as strong states. This study, however, allows a reconsideration of the questions: how strong are the states facing each other across the Strait? To what extent does state power dominate that of enterprises in the complex process of economic interactions across the Taiwan Strait? This is an issue of global significance. The confrontational momentum resulting from this dynamic process has already heightened political tensions in this economically vibrant region. If the situation gets out of control, it can provoke a violent showdown in the Taiwan Strait that would most likely draw the United States and China into a major military conflict with disastrous political and economic consequences.
Both Beijing and Taipei have tried to manipulate cross-Strait economic relationships to achieve their political objectives. But increasing economic integration raises Taipei's concerns over national security because it could lead to economic dependence and political vulnerability. To prevent this, Taipei has maintained a ban on direct transport, trade, and postal services across the Taiwan Strait and has made great efforts to restrict Taiwanese investment flows to the mainland. At the same time, it has also tried to divert this trend through encouraging investment in other locations such as Southeast Asia. While many of the restrictions have been eased or phased out by actual events, many barriers over cross-Strait economic exchange still remain. Taipei still maintains a negative list of sectors in which Taiwanese investment is prohibited. It only allows Taiwanese banks to set up representative offices but not branches. It has restricted Taiwanese investment in chip-fabrication to 8-inch wafer technology, even though the mainland itself has already set up production lines using the latest 12-inch technology. However, despite all these government restrictions and regulations, according to Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) from 1991 to the end of 2004 there are more than 33,155 approved cases of Taiwanese investment in the mainland, with a total investment of more than US$41.25 billion. This corresponds closely to mainland China's statistics of realized Taiwanese investment there. However, according to mainland China's statistics, by the end of September 2004, more than 70,000 Taiwanese-invested firms were operating in the mainland, with a total contracted investment of more than US$76 billion. This is close to an estimate by Taiwan's central bank at more than US$70 billion, which is more than half of all Taiwan's overseas investments.
The scale, depth, and intensity of cross-Strait economic relationships show that many of the government restrictions and regulations have not been effective. In this case, the failure of state intervention in economic interactions across the Taiwan Strait points to the limits of state power to control the movement of capital.
To capture the dynamics of cross-Strait relations, this book first analyzes the politics of strategic interactions between the two sides. It then examines the specific policy designs of both sides regarding the flow of trade and investment across the Taiwan Strait. Finally and most importantly, it analyzes state-society interactions with regard to growing economic relations between the two sides. Unlike previous works on East Asian political economy that talk mostly about state agencies and government policies, the analytical focus of this book is on the organizational dynamics of the private sector and the institutional foundations of state-society linkages and interactions within the context of regionalization and globalization. Special attention is paid to the role of Taiwanese industrial organization, production networks, and the incentive structures of Chinese local governments in the paradoxical developments taking place in current relations across the Taiwan Strait.
The book's analytical focus on industrial organization, especially the role of small and medium-sized firms, is intended to reach beyond the ongoing debate between state-centric theoretical frameworks and neoclassical economics in the study of East Asian political economy. In addition, analysis of the organizational characteristics of the private sector and their respective responses to state policies is also meant to add an explicit institutional dimension to theories of economic statecraft and the post-statist critique that has concentrated mostly on the structural power of big business.
This book began as my doctoral dissertation at Cornell University. Research for the book is based on several field trips and many interviews with business people, banking officers in charge of business of foreign invested firms, scholars, and officials in both Taiwan and mainland China who specialize in cross-Strait relations or are in charge of crossStrait affairs. In addition, I have done extensive archival research and used statistics published both in Taiwan and mainland China.
The completion of the book would have been inconceivable without the help and support of many people. First and foremost, I am deeply grateful to the members of my committee, Vivienne Shue, Peter Katzenstein, and Thomas Christensen, for their help and advice. Vivienne Shue has given encouragment at every stage in the development of this project. Peter Katzenstein has provided me with a most insightful and critical reading of the original draft. Thomas Christensen has always been a teacher and a friend, and his careful reading and corrections of my writings have helped push me to rethink many of my original arguments. I owe great gratitude to Mark Selden who has patiently advised me over the project in many ways. Paul Sorrell has provided excellent editing work of the book. Christopher Way also made a critical reading of the early draft of the book and his comments have also helped improve the text greatly. I also want to thank Anthony Wahl at PalgraveMacmillan and an anonymous reviewer for their encouragement and patience in the review process of the book.
I owe a great deal to the intellectual and personal help of many friends. In particular, I want to thank Raymond Seidelman for his support and friendship over the years. I would probably never have ventured into political science if not for his encouragement and inspiration when I first met him as a graduate student at the Johns Hopkins University-Nanjing University Center for Chinese-American Studies. I would also like to thank Zhu Qingbao at the Institute of Taiwan Studies at Nanjing University, Zhang Guanhua at the Institute of Taiwan Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Weng Junyi at Xiamen University for helping me get access to materials held at their institutions and at the Institute of Taiwan Studies at Xiamen University. Special thanks are due to Chang Zhiyu at the Mainland Affairs Council in Taiwan for providing me with statistics and other materials. Thanks also to Zhang Guang at the Henan Industrial and Commercial Bank and Ding Guofu at the Jiangsu Agricultural Bank for introducing me to businesspeople in various firms. I also want to thank Zhang Songping from the Jiangsu Provincial Government, and Jiang Qiuming from the Jiangsu Academy of Social Sciences for providing data on Jiangsu, and all those in both mainland China and Taiwan who agreed to talk to me and whose help made my research possible. Parts of an earlier version of the project were presented at the conference The New Century, New Perspective at National Taiwan 
